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1. INTRODUCTION
The PSA has been widely used to estimate the over-
all safety of nuclear power plants (NPP). Since the PSA 
represents the safety of a NPP quantitatively, it provides 
base information for risk informed application and risk 
informed regulation [1]. For the effective and correct use 
of PSA in RIA/RIR related decision making, the risk es-
timated by a PSA model should be as realistic as possible. 
For this reason, the ASME PSA standard [2] requires the 
use of realistic and plant specific data to construct the 
PSA model. For the same reason, the ASME standard 
recommends the use of detailed thermal-hydraulic (T-
H) calculations based on the plant specific input data to 
search for success criteria (SC) of a system/function and 
to confirm the appropriateness of accident scenarios. 
Since the PSA is mainly used to check the vulnerabil-
ity of an NPP in the early state of safety assessment, de-
tailed T-H calculations were not applied to the estimation 
of success criteria or to confirm the accident sequence. 
Instead, a simple calculation based on conservative as-
sumptions was widely used to estimate the success criteria 
and accident sequence, which reduced the accuracy of the 
PSA and increased the uncertainty of the results predicted 
by a PSA model [3]. 
In this work, we performed detailed T-H calculations 
for LOCAs with various operating conditions. The re-
sults were used to search SC and to confirm the appro-
priateness of the accident scenarios of the LOCA in a 
reference NPP. In most PSA models, the break size of a 
LOCA is divided into three regions based on the diameter 
of the break: small breaks below 2 inches in diameter, 
medium breaks ranging from 2 inches to 6 inches, and 
large breaks greater than 6 inches. However, in this study, 
this traditional approach is not used. Instead, a variety of 
combinations of safety systems/functions were tested to 
investigate the applicability of each system/function for 
the entire break spectrum. In addition, since the aggres-
sive secondary cooldown (ASC) operation in small-break 
LOCAs has a large impact on the overall risk of an NPP, 
a detailed sensitivity study of the ASC operation was per-
formed as a function of break size and available time for 
this operation. Then, all the results were synthesized to 
improve the existing LOCA PSA model.
This study can be regarded as one of the efforts for 
a first step towards safety margin assessment or risk-in-
firmed safety margin characterization [4], in which de-
terministic safety analysis (DSA) using detailed thermal-
hydraulic calculations is strongly coupled with PSA. In 
Section 2, a variety of LOCA scenarios are calculated 
in detail using the best-estimate code, MARS, and the 
results of the calculations are analyzed. In Section 3, the 
findings in the previous section are used for the improve-
ment of a LOCA PSA model.
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At first, all the calculations were carried out with the 
assumption of no operator actions. However, for SBLO-
CAs, some operator actions, such as the ASC operation, 
can strongly affect the core cooling behaviors. Thus, ad-
ditional calculations for SBLOCAs were conducted with 
different break sizes and operator action times.
2.1 LOCAs with No Operator Actions
For the LOCAs with no operator actions, the condi-
tions of the safety system, including the LPSI, HPSI, and 
AFW, are divided into nine categories. They are listed 
in Table 1. The HPSI capacity was divided into three 
ranks, that is, 0%, 50% and 100%, because the PCT be-
haviors during SBLOCAs are very sensitive to it. The 
safety injection tanks (SIT) are assumed to always be 
available. Break sizes ranging from 1 inch to 30 inches 
were considered for the nine cases. With the given initial 
and boundary conditions [5, 6], the LOCA calculations 
for 154 cases were carried out. When the PCT exceeded 
1,500 K during a calculation, the calculation was termi-
nated because it does not meet the LOCA acceptance cri-
terion (actually 1,477 K) in 10CFR 50.46 [7] and, in this 
case, the PCT was written as 1500 K in the remainder of 
Section 2. 
Fig. 2 shows the effect of HPSI and break size on 
the PCT behaviors when both the LPSI and the AFW are 
2.   BEST-ESTIMATE ANALYSIS OF LOCA WITH 
VARIOUS CONDITIONS
In general, LOCA scenarios are classified into three 
groups by the break size: large-, medium-, and small-
break LOCA. Depending on the break size, the break 
flow from the primary coolant system is determined, re-
sulting in different depressurization and, in turn, different 
core cooling behaviors. 
In this work, the Hanul Nuclear Units 3&4 are se-
lected as a reference plant. Fig. 1 shows the MARS input 
model for the LOCA calculations [5, 6].  
For the improvement of the existing LOCA PSA 
model, LOCA scenarios with various operating condi-
tions were calculated again using the MARS code. The 
followings are the primary concerns in this analysis:
(i)   The integrity of nuclear fuel during a large-break 
LOCA with or without a high-pressure safety in-
jection (HPSI) system and auxiliary feedwater 
(AFW),
(ii)   The integrity of nuclear fuel during a medium-
break LOCA with or without a low-pressure safety 
injection (LPSI) system, 
(iii)  The integrity of nuclear fuel during a small-break 
LOCA without the HPSI and with rapid primary 
depressurization by operator. 
Fig. 1. The MARS Input Model for the LOCA Calculations of the UlChin Nuclear Unit 3&4.
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2.2 LOCAs with Operator Actions
For medium- and large-break LOCAs, the operator 
action is meaningless because the transient proceeds very 
rapidly. On the contrary, for SBLOCAs, the operator ac-
tion can strongly affect the transient. Thus, in this study, 
additional calculations were conducted for SBLOCAs 
with different break sizes and operator action times. The 
operator action considered in this study is the ASC op-
eration; the operator opens the atmospheric dump valves 
(ADVs) in the steam line [8], which leads to a rapid 
primary depressurization and, in turn, triggering of the 
SIT and LPSI. According to the emergency operation 
procedure of KSNP [9], the maximum cooldown rate 
is, however, limited to 55.6 oC/hr to prevent a pressur-
ized thermal shock. To model the operator action with 
this limitation, an ADV control algorithm was developed 
using a proportional-integral control unit in the MARS 
code [5]. 
available. When the break size is greater than 3.2 inches, 
the integrity of nuclear fuel is assured without the HPSI. 
On the contrary, when the break size is less than 3.2 inches, 
fuel damage occurs without the HPSI. Fig. 3 shows the 
effect of HPSI and break size on the PCT behaviors when 
the LPSI is available and the AFW is not available. Com-
paring Fig. 2 with Fig. 3, it can be shown that the AFW 
does not have a significant effect on the PCT. However, 
when the break diameter is less than 1.1 inch, fuel dam-
age occurs when half of the HPSI is available. 
When both the LPSI and the AFW are unavailable, 
the effect of HPSI and break size on the PCT behaviors 
is depicted in Fig. 4. In this case, if the HPSI is not avail-
able, the nuclear fuel is damaged for all of the break sizes. 
However, when half of the HPSI is available, the integrity 
of nuclear fuel would be assured for some LBLOCAs. If 
the HPSI is fully available, the integrity of the nuclear 
fuel is assured for all of the break sizes.
Fig. 2. The Effects of the HPSI and Break Size on the PCT 
when Both the LPSI and the AFW are Available.
Fig. 4. The Effects of the HPSI and the Break size on the PCT 
when Both the LPSI and the AFW are Not Available.
Fig. 3. The Effects of the HPSI and Break Size on the PCT 
when Both the LPSI is Available and the AFW is Not Available.
HPSI LPSI AFW
Case A1 0% 100% 100%
Case B1 50% 100% 100%
Case C1 100% 100% 100%
Case A2 0% 100% 0%
Case B2 50% 100% 0%
Case C2 100% 100% 0%
Case A3 0% 0% 0%
Case B3 50% 0% 0%
Case C3 100% 0% 0%
Table 1.  Conditions of the Safety Systems for the LOCA Analysis
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ment in a few seconds and then the RCS is rapidly de-
pressurized. As a result, the HPSI, SIT, and LPSI actuate, 
injecting the cooling water into the RCS. In Section 2.1, 
it was shown that when the HPSI is fully available, even 
without the LPSI, the integrity of the nuclear fuel is as-
sured for all break sizes. This was not taken into account 
in the previous PSA model.
Fig. 5 shows the previous event tree for an LBLOCA, 
where the availability of the HPSI was not considered. 
Thus, in the new one in Fig. 6, the HPSI is added as a new 
heading of the event tree and it is proposed as a success 
criteria.
3.2 Medium-Break LOCA
The medium break is a break ranging from 2 inches 
to 6 inches in diameter. Figs. 7 and 8 show the previous 
and new event tree for an MBLOCA, respectively. In the 
early phase of the accident, the primary pressure is higher 
than the shutoff head of the LPSI pump and the emer-
gency core coolant cannot be injected into the RCS. For 
this reason, the LPSI is not considered in the previous 
event tree. However, for breaks greater than 3.2 inches, 
the fuel integrity would be assured because the SIT and 
The conditions of the SBLOCA calculations are as-
sumed as follows:
(i)   Break diameters ranging from 0.625 inch to 2 
inches were normally considered. Breaks with 
2.5, 3.0, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 inches are additionally 
included. 
(ii)   Operator action time ranging from 10 to 60 min, 
in 10 minute steps, are considered. 
(iii)   The HPSI is assumed to be unavailable, whereas 
the SIT and LPSI are assumed to be available.
The third assumption was used because, when the HPSI 
is fully available, core damage does not occur for any of 
the break sizes.
Table 2 summarizes the resulting PCT according to 
the operator action time and break sizes in the SBLOCAs. 
According to the results, when the break size is less than 
1.5 inch, the integrity of nuclear fuel would be assured by 
the ASC operation. It is shown that the operator action 
time can affect the PCT in the breaks from 1.6 inch to 2 
inches. When the break size ranges from 2 inches to 3.2 
inches, fuel damage occurs regardless of the operator ac-
tion time. When the break size is greater than 3.2 inches, 
the fuel integrity is assured regardless of the operator ac-
tion time because of rapid depressurization and subse-
quent SIT and LPSI injection.
 
3.  IMPROVEMENT OF THE PSA MODEL
For the PSA model improvement, the findings of the 
MARS calculations were reflected to change both acci-
dent sequences and success criteria of the event trees for 
the LOCA scenarios. In this work, the existing event tree 
model for Hanul Nuclear Units 3&4 [10] was adopted as 
a reference.
3.1 Large-Break LOCA
The large break is defined as any break in the cold leg 
greater than 6 inches in diameter. If an LBLOCA occurs, 
the RCS reactor coolant is discharged into the contain-
Break size (Diameter in inch)
0.625 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.4
Operator 
action time
(min)
10 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 1500 1500 1500 1494 1439 1393
20 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 1462 1500 1500 1500 1500 1488 1445 1404
30 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 935 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1493 1445 1404
40 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1493 1445 1404
50 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1493 1445 1404
60 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1493 1445 1404
Table 2.  Calculated PCT (K) According to the Operator Action Time and Break Size
Fig. 5. The Previous Event Tree for the LBLOCA.   
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the LPSI are available. These calculation results were re-
flected in the event tree in Fig. 8. Thus, in the new event 
tree, the break size, the LPSI, and the LPSI recirculation 
are added as new heading of the event tree and it is pro-
posed as a success criteria. The LPSI recirculation should 
be added because the LPSI itself is added.
3.3 Small-Break LOCA
The small break is a break ranging from 3/8-inch to 
2 inches in diameter. Fig. 9 shows the event tree for an 
SBLOCA. In the case of an SBLOCA, the RCS is slowly 
depressurized and the reactor is usually tripped by the 
low RCS pressure signal. However, since the RCS re-
mains for a long time at a relatively high pressure, the 
SIT and LPSI may not inject the water into the RCS. The 
transient is rather mild and complicated in comparison 
Fig. 6. The New Event Tree for the LBLOCA.
Fig. 7. The Previous Event Tree for the MBLOCA.   Fig. 8. The New Event Tree for the MBLOCA.  
Fig. 9. The Event Tree of the SBLOCA.
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In summary, a best-estimate thermal-hydraulic anal-
ysis for various LOCA scenarios was carried out. The 
findings were used for a closer coupling between DSA 
and PSA, finally leading to an improvement of the LOCA 
PSA model.
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with those of medium-break LOCAs. This, in turn, im-
plies the possibility of operator action to mitigate the 
transients. If the operator depressurizes the RCS rapidly, 
e.g., by using the ADVs in the steam line, the SIT and 
LPSI can inject the emergency core cooling water into 
the reactor core. Thus, it was necessary to re-analyze the 
effect of operator action and break sizes to implement the 
results into a new event tree. These features were already 
considered in the previous event tree. Therefore, there 
is no change in the accident sequences of the event tree 
of SBLOCA. Instead, the effect of operator action and 
break size, shown in Table 2, is considered in terms of the 
operator action failure probability [11]. It would have an 
effect on the core damage frequency.
4.  CONCLUSIONS
In this work, the LOCA scenarios of Hanul Nuclear 
Units 3&4 were analyzed, using the MARS code, with 
various combinations of break sizes, operating conditions 
of the safety system, and the operator action time for 
rapid primary-side depressurization. The results of the 
LOCA calculations were analyzed in a systematic way. 
The findings from the results were reflected in the im-
provement of the existing PSA model by changing both 
the accident sequences and success criteria of the event 
trees for the LOCA scenarios. The changes in the event 
tree are summarized as follows:
(i)  The HPSI system was added as a heading in the 
event tree for the LBLOCA. If the HPSI is fully 
available, the integrity of nuclear fuel is assured 
even without the LPSI system.
(ii)  The LPSI system, the break size, and the LPSI 
recirculation system were newly added as a 
heading in the event tree for the MBLOCA. Ac-
cording to the previous event tree, the nuclear 
fuel would be damaged if the HPSI were not 
available. However, it is shown that core dam-
age may occur depending on the availability of 
the LPSI and the break size.
(iii)  In the case of the SBLOCA, the event tree itself 
is not changed. Instead, the effect of operator ac-
tion and break size is considered in terms of the 
operator action failure probability. It would have 
an effect on the core damage frequency.
